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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801, 
63G-4-403, and 78-4-103(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Where Ms. Christensen's cumulative work exertions over 12 hour shifts, 
using tools weighing up to 70 pounds, over the course of four months and culminated in 
injury on November 20, 2001, whether the Labor Commission acted reasonably and 
rationally when it ruled that Ms. Christensen was injured by cumulative trauma accident. 
Standard of Review: 
This Court should review for reasonableness. The Legislature granted the 
Commission discretion to determine the facts and apply the law. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-
1-301. Reviewing courts "grant the Commission a measure of discretion when applying 
the legal standard to a given set of facts." Drake v. Indus. Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 
(Utah 1997). When the Legislature has granted an agency discretion to determine an 
issue, the agency's action is reviewed for reasonableness. AE Clevite, Inc. v. Labor 
Comm % 2000 UT App 35 \ 7, 996 P.2d 1072, 1074, cert, denied, 4 p.3d 1289 (Utah 
2000). Courts also resolve "any doubt respecting the right of compensation in favor of 
the injured employee." Drake, 939 P.2d at 182. 
vi 
In AE Clevite, this Court reviewed the Commission's determination that an 
employee sustained injuries in the course of his employment. The facts were undisputed: 
Mr.Tjas was at his home office, salting his icy driveway in anticipation of a work-related 
package delivery, when he slipped, fell, and sustained severe spinal injuries. The 
Commission ruled that his injuries arose from his employment. On appeal, AE Clevite 
argued that the injuries were not sustained in the course of his employment, or arose out 
of his employment. Id. at ^ 8, 1074-5 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401). This Court 
affirmed the Commission's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard, and held that 
"the Commission did not err in ruling" that the injury arose from Mr. Tjas' employment. 
Id. at U 13, 1077. 
Similarly, this Court should review for reasonableness because in Ms. 
Christensen's case, the appeal arose from the same Commission applying the same statute 
as the AE Clevite case.1 In that case, the facts were not in dispute. Similarly, Smith's did 
not dispute the facts of Ms. Christensen's exertions; only whether those facts stated an 
accident claim.2 Brief at 16. This Court should uphold the Commission's determination 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 ("by accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee's employment"). In AE Clevite, this Court reviewed for reasonableness 
the Commission's findings and application of the law as to "arising out of and in the 
course employment." This Court should review for reasonableness the Commission's 
findings and application of law as to determine whether Ms. Christensen's facts showed 
she was injured "by accident." 
2
 See discussion infra, Part I. 
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unless it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. AE Clevite, 2000 UT App 
at t7 ,996P.2dat l074. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401: 
(1) An employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment... shall be paid . . . compensation 
for loss sustained on account of the injury . . . the amount provide in this 
chapter for medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case is about a cumulative trauma accident case that was plead and proven 
before the administrative law judge, and upheld by the Labor Commission. Ms. 
Christensen initially plead an occupational disease claim, then dismissed the claim at the 
hearing, without objection by Smith's. Ms. Christensen presented evidence on two 
accident claims to the Commission, including a cumulative trauma accident. After the 
Commission found she had been injured "by accident," Smith's sought to recast Ms. 
Christensen9s claim as an occupational disease claim, under a different statute, with 
different requirements, and a lesser remedy. This appeal is about: 1) whether Ms. 
Christensen's repetitive work exertions with tools weighing as much as 70 pounds, during 
12 hour shifts over a four month period, were both the legal and medical cause of her 
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injuries; 2) whether Smith's must remain liable for accident compensation because it 
identified no error in either the Commission's legal or its medical cause analysis, and 
remains liable for Ms. Christensen's accident; and, 3) whether Ms. Christensen had the 
right to choose her cause of action for cumulative trauma accident, or if instead, the 
Commission can and must convert her accident to another cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Christensen has worked for Smith's Food & Drug (Smith's) since 1993. She 
has worked in various positions, including as a cheese cook, making cottage cheese in 
large industrial vats. 
Ms. Christensen was diagnosed with cervical injury on November 20, 2001, and 
required cervical fusion surgery from C4 to C7 to treat multiple large disc herniations. R. 
12. Ms. Christensen filed alternative claims for compensation. She filed three claims: 
Two accident claims (one for cumulative trauma for 11/20/01, R. 23, and another for 
2/1/01 date of injury, R. 2) and an occupational disease claim. R. 35. At her hearing, she 
withdrew her occupational disease claim, and Smith's did not object. R. 88. Ms. 
Christensen presented two alternative accident claims to the administrative law judge for 
decision. 
At her hearing, Ms. Christensen presented medical evidence in support of both 
accidents, including a statement from her treating surgeon, who opined that her work at 
ix 
Smith's, and particularly, her work as a cheese cook, resulted in injury on 11/20/01. R. 
12. 
Ms. Christensen also testified as to her accidents at Smith's. She testified as to her 
fall on 2/1/01, where she struck the back of her neck against a metal box. R. 174. She 
also testified about her duties as a cheese cook, which led to her injury on November 20, 
2001, including, inter alia: lifting stainless steel screens with wire (length-wise cutters) to 
attach to an overhead mechanism over the vats; attaching a cross cut knife to an overhead 
mechanism, which she would push and pull, back and forth across the vat at shoulder 
height for the entire length of the vat, about 8 times per vat; pulling knives out of the vat; 
inserting a 6 foot heater into the vat (5-10 pounds); inserting 6 foot stainless steel paddles 
(50-60 pounds) into an overhead mechanism above the vat at shoulder level with arms 
outstretched, commonly requiring multiple efforts; removing the 6 foot paddles and 
placing them in the next vat, for the same process; attaching 2 pushers (65-70 pounds) to 
the same overhead mechanism used for the paddles, and using the same movements to 
attach as the paddles; cleaning the vats by reaching over the sides and scrubbing the 
bottom and sides with brush attached to a 5 to 6 foot long handle; and, rinsing the vat. 
There were 8 vats in the room, so there were never empty vats; she was constantly 
working during her shift. Ms. Christensen worked 12 hour shifts, with breaks that totaled 
between one hour to one hour and fifteen minutes. Ms. Christensen performed the 
x 
foregoing repetitive tasks for about 10.75 to 11 hours per shift. R. 134, 176 - 84. Ms. 
Christensen performed these shifts from August, 2001 until her cervical injury was 
diagnosed on November 20, 2001. R. 135, 176 - 84. 
Petitioner also testified that about 3-4 months before November 2001, she had 
experienced shoulder pain that was exacerbated by work, but it had always resolved. But 
in November 2001, she testified that she experienced a different type of pain and stiffness 
in her shoulder than before, and that on approximately November 10, 2001, she 
experienced constant wrist, elbow and shoulder pain. R. 134-5, 184-5. 
On June 2, 2004, the judge issued her findings of fact and interim order. R. 59-65. 
On June 24, 2004, the judge referred the medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel. R. 67-8. 
On February 23, 2005, the panel issued its report. The report stated that there was 
a medical causal connection between Ms. Christensen's cumulative trauma accident of 
November 20, 2001, and her cervical injuries. The panel was asked whether the medical 
care was necessitated by the cumulative trauma accident. Instead of answering yes/no, 
the panel apportioned permanent impairment and the need for medical care 60/40 
between non-industrial and industrial causes, as if Ms. Christensen's claim were for 
occupational disease. R. 72-3. 
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On March 18, 2005, Ms. Christensen filed objections to the medical panel report. 
R. 77 - 84. 
On March 31, 2005, Smith's filed a response to Ms. Christensen's objections. R. 
95-113. 
On August 31, 2005, the judge requested the panel supplement its report. The 
judge explained that cumulative trauma accidents were accident claims, and not 
occupational disease claims, and further, that it was inappropriate for the panel to 
apportion Ms. Christensen's claim as if it were for occupational disease. R. 115. 
On September 8, 2005, the panel issued its supplemental report. R. 118-9. 
On September 23, 2005, Smith's objected to the supplemental report. 120-1. 
On November 7, 2005, Ms. Christensen responded to Smith's objection to the 
supplemental report. R. 122-3. 
On December 29, 2005, the judge requested the panel again supplement its report. 
R. 124. 
On January 10, 2005, the panel supplemented its report, explaining that the acute 
herniations seen at the time of surgery lead to the conclusion that Ms. Christensen's 
cervical injuries were best explained by an acute event; the November 2001 accident. It 
also opined that all of her permanent impairment was attributable to the November 20, 
2001 accident. R. 127. 
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On June 29, 2006, the judge issued her findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
order. The judge found that the November 20, 2001 cumulative trauma accident was the 
legal and medical cause of her cervical injuries, and ordered Smith's to pay appropriate 
compensation and medical treatment expenses. R. 131 - 45. 
On July 26, 2006, Smith's filed its Motion for Review. Smith's did not appeal the 
facts of Ms. Christensen's accident. Nor did it appeal whether the accident was the legal 
cause or medical cause of her injuries. Instead it argued that: (1) Ms. Christensen's claim 
was for occupational disease, and not accident; and, (2) that her cumulative trauma claim 
should be dismissed because her pre-existing conditions contributed to her injuries. R. 
146 - 196. Smith's abandoned this second argument in the present appeal. 
On March 16, 2009, the Commission issued its Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. 
This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the Commission's order awarding compensation by 
cumulative trauma accident. Ms. Christensen was injured "by accident" because her 
repetitive work exertions with tools weighing up to 70 pounds, during twelve hour shifts 
over a four month period, were the legal and medical cause of her injuries. Smith's did 
not appeal the Commission's determination on legal or medical cause, and identified no 
particular error in either analysis. Instead, it simply argued that there was no accident, 
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and that Ms. Christensen's claim was for occupational disease. Smith's would recast Ms. 
Christensen's claim as occupational disease, so that it need only pay a percentage of her 
compensation. But Ms. Christensen chose to present her cumulative trauma accident 
claim to the Commission, and was awarded full compensation for her accident. Courts 
can not convert causes of action, and the Commission could not convert Ms. 
Christensen's accident claim to occupational disease, even if it were so inclined. This 
Court should affirm the Commission's order, and hold that Ms. Christensen's repetitive 
work exertions with tools weighing up to 70 pounds, during twelve hour shifts over a four 
month period, were the legal and medical cause of her injuries 
xiv 
ARGUMENT 
I. MS. CHRISTENSEN WAS INJURED "BY ACCIDENT" BECAUSE HER 
REPETITIVE WORK EXERTIONS WITH TOOLS WEIGHING UP TO 70 
POUNDS, DURING 12 HOUR SHIFTS OVER A FOUR MONTH PERIOD, 
WERE THE LEGAL AND MEDICAL CAUSE OF HER INJURIES. 
Ms. Christensen was injured in a cumulative trauma accident. Smith's brief 
ignored cumulative trauma theories of industrial accident, even though that was Ms. 
Christensen's theory of recovery, and the basis for the Commission's award. Instead, it 
argued that there was no accident because "There was no sudden, unexpected or 
unintended occurrence that either caused or resulted in an injury to Ms. Christensen's 
cervical spine in November 2001."3 Brief at 20 (emphasis added). But "accidents" have 
3
 Smith's brief misstated an important distinction. The Supreme Court 
explained that "accidents" include unintended "occurrences," and may be either the cause 
of the injury or the injury itself. But Smith's brief represented that the unintended 
"occurrence" could only mean the cause of the injury. Brief at 20. This misstatement of 
law was essential to its argument: "There was no sudden, unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that either caused or resulted in an injury to Ms. Christensen's cervical spine 
in November 2001." Brief at 20 (emphasis added). Because the cause of Ms. 
Christensen's injuries did not occur entirely in November, 2001, went the argument, her 
claim was not an accident. Id. This was misleading, and contrary to Utah law. The Utah 
Supreme Court explained that "[WJhere either the cause of the injury or the result of an 
exertion was different from what would normally be expected to occur, the occurrence 
was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore 'by accident.'" Allen 729 P.2d at 
22 
The inclusion of "unexpected cause OR unexpected result of the exertion" is an 
important for cumulative trauma accidents. The purpose of allowing cumulative trauma 
accidents is to appropriately account for exertions, which in isolation, may not cause 
injury, but when combined, may amount to unusual or extraordinary wear and tear when 
compared to typical non-employment life. The "unexpected result" is the essence of 
cumulative trauma accidents: the injury (unexpected result) may not be expected from a 
single isolated exertion, but can be easily understood when combined with other isolated 
never been restricted to a single, discrete exertion, and Utah appellate courts have upheld 
cumulative accidents that occurred over the course of several days or months. This Court 
should affirm the Commission's decision because Ms. Christensen's cumulative repetitive 
exertions over four months were the medical and legal cause of her injuries. 
A. Utah Courts Have Never Limited Accident Claims To Single Exertion 
Injuries. 
Long before it decided Allen v, Labor Commfn, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986),4 the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized cumulative trauma theories of industrial accident. Over 
twenty years before it decided the Allen case, the Court explained that accidents are 
not necessarily restricted to some single incident which 
happened suddenly at one particular time and does not 
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other 
repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such manner as 
to properly fall within the definition of an accident 
exertions for the purpose of determining legal cause. 
Smith's argument should fail because this Court is bound to uphold decades of 
Supreme Court precedent allowing cumulative trauma accidents. If accidents can occur 
from multiple exertions, those exertions necessarily occur at separate times; not a single 
place and time. Smith's argument that there was no accident because there was "no 
occurrence that caused or [injured] Ms. Christensen's cervical spine in November, 2001," 
Brief at 20, fails because accidents may encompass repetitive exertions over different 
times. Put another way, Ms. Christensen's repetitive exertions during 12 hour shifts over 
four months stated a claim for industrial accident. This Court should follow well-settled 
Utah law, and affirm the Commission's order that found Ms. Christensen was injured by 
cumulative trauma accident. 
4
 The Allen decision set forth the dual requirements of every accident: legal and 
medical cause. See discussion infra, Part II. 
2 
Carting v. Indus. Comm % 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 205 (1965). 
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly upheld industrial accident claims under 
cumulative or repetitive trauma theories. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1981) (cumulative trauma where employee "scal[ed] rock from the roof of the mine 
and shoveling it onto a conveyor belt"); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 P.2d 508 (1980) 
(cumulative trauma where reaching to shovel under a conveyor belt, and pop in the back); 
Miera v. Indus. Comm % 728 P.2d 1023, 1024, (Utah 1986) (repetitive jumps into eight -
foot hole at thirty-minute intervals was legal cause of injury); Nyrehn v. Indus. Comm % 
800 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (cumulative trauma where lifting tubs of merchandise 
weighing between fifteen and forty pounds, thirty to thirty-six times a day, over two and a 
half months); Stouffer Foods v. Indus. Comm % 801 P.2d 179, (Utah App 1990) 
(cumulative trauma where repetitively or continuously gripping high pressure water hoses 
for up to eight hours). Utah courts have broadly interpreted the term "accident," 
consistent with the Act's purpose to pay benefits to injured employees. 
R. Exertions Are Determinative In Accident Cases. 
Smith's argument ignored well-settled Utah law because cumulative trauma claims 
combine several exertions into a single exertion. "Exertion" for the purpose of proving 
legal causation, is the "aggregate exertion of the repetitive exertions that establish the 
accident." Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 336 (citing Miera with approval). In Nyrehn, this Court 
3 
found that it was "unquestionable" that two and a half months of lifting tubs of 
merchandise 30 to 35 times a day would cause unusual and extraordinary wear and tear 
on a body when compared to usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Ms. Christensen's exertions involved 
greater weights and were more rigorous than in the Nyrehn case, and occurred over a 
similar time period (almost three months for Ms. Nyrehn; four months for Ms. 
Christensen). It did not matter that Ms. Christensen's exertions occurred over four 
months, instead of a single incident. Instead, the exertions - not their duration - determine 
whether an employees' activities amount to an "accident," as suggested by Smith's.5 
5
 Ms. Christensen's position squares with common sense because it 
recognizes the significance of exertions in accident cases. For example: Assume two 
employees regularly lifted 70 pound boxes at work, and that they had performed the same 
job for several years. Over the course of 3-4 months, assume that the first employee 
began to experience discrete back pain at work when lifting the boxes, and finally, one 
day following his shift, he experienced new and different intractable pain in the same area 
of his low back. Assume that the second employee injured his back one day while lifting 
a single 70 pound box. Assume that both employees were diagnosed with the same type 
of low back injury as a result of their respective work activities. 
Under Ms. Christensen's position, both employees could bring an accident claims 
because lifting 70 pound boxes exceeds normal non-employment exertions. But under 
Smith's argument, the first employee could only bring an occupational disease claim 
because his exertions had occurred over a period of months, while the second employee 
could bring an accident claim, because he injured his back from a single lift. In other 
words, even though they both injured their backs from lifting 70 pound boxes, the first 
employee's remedy would be significantly diminished solely because he was not injured 
from a single lifting episode. The first employee would only be entitled to a percentage 
of his medical treatment and wage loss benefit his back injury occurred over 3-4 months 
of lifting 70 pound boxes, while the second employee would receive 100% of his medical 
treatment and wage loss benefit because his injury occurred from a single lifting episode. 
4 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. Contrary to Smith's position, all other things being equal, exertions 
that occur over a longer duration provide for a greater possible combined exertion, 
making legal cause (presumably) easier to demonstrate. Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 336. 
Smith's brief ignored Ms. Christensen's exertions, but they were determinative in her 
accident claim. 
C. Ms. Christensen's Work Activities Over Four Months Were The Legal 
Cause Of Her Injuries. 
The undisputed facts show that Ms. Christensen's exertions over four months were 
the legal cause of her injury because they were above and beyond those encountered in 
typical non-employment life. The judge found that Ms. Christensen's degenerative 
condition contributed to her cervical injuries, and so applied the heightened Allen 
standard for legal causation. R. 138-9. Ms. Christensen testified as to her specific work 
activities as a cheese cook, making cottage cheese in industrial vats that were 4.5 feet 
high and 25 to 40 feet long. All work in the vat (except to clean it) was done at 
approximately shoulder height or higher, owing to the height of the vat. 
Under Smith's argument, if Ms. Christensen had injured herself by lifting a single 
70 pound paddle, she could bring an accident claim. But because she was injured from 
repeatedly lifting 70 pound paddles (among other things), Smith's argues she could not 
state a claim for accident. Put another way, Smith's interpretation of the law defies 
common sense and the law: It ignores the nature of employees' exertions, and only 
considers their duration. This Court should reject Smith's argument as both contrary to 
settled law and common sense. 
5 
Ms. Christensen testified that her activities included, inter alia: lifting stainless 
steel screens with wire (length-wise cutters) to attach to an overhead mechanism over the 
vats; attaching a cross cut knife to an overhead mechanism, which she would push and 
pull, back and forth across the vat at shoulder height for the entire length of the vat, about 
8 times per vat; pulling knives out of the vat; inserting 6 foot heater into the vat (5-10 
pounds); inserting 6 foot stainless steel paddles(50-60 pounds) into an overhead 
mechanism above the vat at shoulder level with arms outstretched, commonly requiring 
multiple efforts; removing the 6 foot paddles and placing them in the next vat, for the 
same process; attaching 2 pushers (65-70 pounds) to the same mechanism used for the 
paddles, and using the same movements to attach as the paddles; cleaning the vats by 
reaching over the sides and scrubbing the bottom and sides with brush attached to a 5 to 6 
foot long handle; and, rinsing the vat. There were 8 vats in the room, so there were never 
empty vats. Petitioner worked 12 hour shifts, with breaks that totaled between one hour 
to one hour and fifteen minutes. R. 134. In other words, Ms. Christensen performed the 
foregoing repetitive tasks for about 10.75 to 11 hours per shift. Ms. Christensen 
performed these shifts from August, 2001 until her cervical injury was diagnosed on 
November 20, 2001. R. 135. 
Petitioner also testified that about 3-4 months before November 2001, she had 
experienced shoulder pain that was exacerbated by work, but it had always resolved. But 
6 
in November 2001, she testified that she experienced a different type of pain and stiffness 
in her shoulder than before, and that on approximately November 10, 2001, she 
experienced constant wrist, elbow and shoulder pain. R. 134-5. Ms. Christensen was 
diagnosed with cervical injury on November 20, 2001. 
The ALJ cited the Nyrehn case in support of her conclusion that Petitioner's 
aggregate exertions during 12 hour shifts, over approximately four months, of repetitive 
lifting, connecting, pushing/pulling and cleaning either overhead or back and forth at 
shoulder height, and repetitively lifting overhead tools weighing up to 70 pounds, 
exceeded typical nonemployment life activities identified in the Allen case. R. 139. Ms. 
Christensen proved that her work activities were the legal cause of her neck injuries. 
But Smith's brief was completely silent on legal cause. It did not even cite the 
Nyrehn case, even though the ALJ relied on it to award benefits. This Court should 
affirm the Commission's award of benefits to Ms. Christensen, and should hold that Ms. 
Christensen's facts satisfied the heightened Allen standard for legal causation, because 
they exceeded typical non-employment exertions. 
IX Ms. Christensen's Work Activities Over Four Months Were The Medical 
Cause Of Her Injuries. 
Ms. Christensen also proved that her exertions were the medical cause of her 
injuries. The medical panel found a medical causal connection between her work 
activities and her injuries. R. 139. The panel may have been confused because it tried to 
7 
apportion Ms. Christensen's benefits as if she had tried an occupational disease claim. 
But the ALJ remedied the panel error, and awarded Ms. Christensen compensation and 
medical treatment expenses without apportionment, pursuant to settled Utah law. 
Smith's brief argued that it was appropriate for the medical panel to apportion Ms. 
Christensen's the medical cause of her cervical injuries - under the Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. Brief at 22. Smith's argument was the tail wagging the dog: The panel 
erred,6 but according to Smith's, the medical panel's errant response should dictate the 
outcome of this case. No occupational disease claim was before the Commission,7 so it 
was inappropriate for the panel to treat her claim as an occupational disease claim. The 
Commission affirmed that Ms. Christensen's "benefits [were] appropriately awarded 
under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act" because it was an accident claim, and that 
"there [was] no need to address whether apportionment might be appropriate^ under the 
Occupational Disease Act." R. 209. 
The ALJ found that the cumulative trauma accident was the legal and medical 
cause of Ms. Christensen's injuries. Accordingly, the ALJ ordered Smith's to pay all 
temporary total disability compensation and all related medical treatment expenses, along 
6
 R. 72-3. Ms. Christensen identified the error, R. 77 - 84, and the judge 
instructed the panel to correct its error. R. 115. 
7
 Smith's did not object to Ms. Christensen's withdrawal of her occupational 
disease claim at the hearing. R. 3. 
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with apportioned permanent partial disability. Id. at 13. This Court should affirm 
because Ms. Christensen proved that the industrial accident was both the legal and 
medical cause of her injuries. 
II. SMITH'S APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE MS. CHRISTENSEN WAS 
INJURED IN A CUMULATIVE TRAUMA ACCIDENT, AND SMITH'S 
IDENTIFIED NO ERROR AS TO LEGAL OR MEDICAL CAUSE, 
THEREFORE, SMITH'S REMAINS LIABLE FOR MS. CHRISTENSEN'S 
ACCIDENT. 
Smith's remains liable for Petitioner's industrial accident claim, because it failed 
to identify any particular error as to legal or medical cause - the dual elements of every 
industrial accident. Employers are liable to pay compensation and benefits to employees 
who are injured "by accident." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-401. While the Act has never 
defined "accident," the case law sets forth the elements of an industrial accident. Under 
the seminal case of Allen v. Labor Comm 'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
Court set forth the dual requirements for industrial accidents under Utah law. Employees 
must prove that the accident was the "legal cause" of their injury: that their exertions 
legally satisfy the test of "arising out of the employment." Id. at 25. Employees must 
also prove "medical cause": that the injury "was medically the result of an exertion or 
injury that occurred during a work-related activity." Id. at 27. Every industrial accident 
case since Allen has determined compensability based on the two part test of legal and 
medical causation. Smith's is liable for Ms. Christensen's accident claim because it 
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identified no error as to the legal or medical cause of her injuries. 
Smith's brief identified no specific error in either the Commission's legal cause or 
medical cause analysis. Smith's brief tried to have it both ways: on one hand, it identified 
no specific error in the Commission's findings as to the essential elements of the accident 
(legal cause, medical cause); on the other hand, it baldly presumed that the Commission 
was wrong and there was no accident. Brief at 16. In other words, Smith's appeal 
amounted to second-guessing Ms. Christensen's cause of action without demonstrating 
error in either element of her accident claim. But Smith's can not make the 
Commission's findings go away by ignoring them. Having failed to demonstrate any 
error as to the essential elements of Ms. Christensen's claim, Smith's appeal can not 
disturb the Commission's finding that Ms. Christensen was injured in an industrial 
accident. This Court should deny Smith's appeal, and affirm the Commission's finding 
that Ms. Christensen was injured in a cumulative trauma accident. 
This Court should sustain the facts because Smith's brief urged this court to 
reweigh the evidence without appealing the facts. The brief baldly argued that "Ms. 
Christensen did not sustain an accident at work," and then spent considerable energy 
reviewing only the facts that supported its argument that Ms. Christensen suffered an 
occupational disease claim. Brief at 16 - 19. But having failed to appeal any of the facts, 
this was an attempt to impermissibly "reweigh the Commission's factual determination 
10 
under the guise of reviewing the application of facts to the law." Martinez v. Media-
Paymaster, 2007 UT 42, % 10. It was improper to try to "reweigh the Commission's 
factual determinations" that Ms. Christensen's accident was the legal cause and the 
medical cause of her injuries, where no particular factual findings were appealed. 
Even if Smith's had appealed the facts, its appeal should be denied because its 
brief did not marshal the evidence, and therefore failed to identify any fatal factual error. 
To successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the appealing party must marshal 
"all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, 
and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm % 776 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). But the brief contained no discussion of the facts that 
supported the Order, and therefore, failed to "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
This Court should deny Smith's claims because it failed to identify any error in the 
Commission's legal cause or medical cause findings. The brief failed to marshal the 
evidence, and identified no fatal evidentiary flaw. Instead, Smith's brief reweighed the 
evidence under the guise of applying the facts to the law. This Court should affirm the 
Commission's order in favor of Ms. Christensen. 
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III. SMITH'S APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE THE LABOR COMMISSION 
COULD NOT CONVERT INDUSTRIAL MS. CHRISTENSEN'S 
ACCIDENT CLAIM TO AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIM. 
This Court should affirm Ms. Christensen's award of benefits because she proved 
her accident claim, and there was no legal basis to convert her industrial accident claim to 
an occupational disease claim. This section shows that industrial accident claims are not 
identical to occupational disease claims, and provide different remedies to injured 
workers, and are not interchangeable. This section also demonstrates that there was no 
legal basis to convert one claim to another claim, even if the Commission were so 
inclined. Finally, this section reviews settled case law that bars the Commission from 
changing even a theory of recovery in an accident case, let alone converting one cause of 
action to a different cause of action with different remedies. 
A. Industrial Accident Claims Are Not Identical to Occupational Disease 
Claims, Provide Different Remedies, And Are Not Interchangeable. 
Accident claims and occupational disease claims are not interchangeable because 
they are different claims with different requirements, and different remedies. Accident 
claims arise under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, 
et.seq., while occupational disease claims arise under the Utah Occupational Disease Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-101, et. seq. The requirements to prove accident claims are 
different from proving occupational disease claims. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
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401 (elements of industrial accident) with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103 (elements of 
occupational disease). The biggest difference is that occupational disease claims require 
only medical proof of an injurious exposure that injured the employee. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-3-110. Industrial accidents, in contrast, require proof of BOTH medical cause AND 
legal cause8 to demonstrate a compensable injury. All other things equal, accidents are 
harder to prove because there is an additional crucial element to prove: specific exertions 
that were the legal cause of the injury. 
Accident claims also provide a greater remedy for injured workers. Industrial 
accident claims typically pay more compensation because weekly benefits are paid in full. 
In contrast, under occupational disease claims, all benefits - weekly compensation and 
medical treatment expenses - are apportioned. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110. Obviously, 
occupational disease claims are typically much less expensive for employers and insurers 
than accident claims. The employee's choice of remedy dictates both the evidentiary 
burden, and the amount of benefits payable for the work injuries. Accident claims and 
occupational disease claims are very different claims, and are not interchangeable. 
In this case, Ms. Christensen filed an industrial accident claim, proved her case, 
and the Commission ordered Smith's to pay benefits and compensation commensurate 
8
 Legal cause analysis looks at non-medical facts, specifically exertions, for 
the purpose of determining whether pre-existing conditions or the subject accident was 
the legal cause of the injury (akin to proximate cause analysis in torts). See discussion, 
infra, Parts I and II. 
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with accidents. R. 131-45. Smith's appeal seeks to retroactively convert Ms. 
Christensen's accident claim to an occupational disease so that it can pay her only a 
fraction of her compensation and medical treatment expenses. But there was no legal 
basis to convert her claims, and this Court should deny Smith's appeal. 
B. The Labor Commission Can Not Convert Accident Claims to Occupational 
Disease Claims. 
Petitioner's industrial accident claim can not be converted into an occupational 
disease claim. Yet the premise of Smith's appeal is that it can and should have been so 
converted, and further, that it was legal error to not convert it. This section shows that 
there was no legal basis for the Commission to convert Ms. Christensen's cause of action. 
To the contrary, the Commission is barred from even changing the employee's theory of 
recovery under the same cause of action, let alone converting it to a different cause of 
action. This Court should deny Smith's appeal because there was no legal basis to 
convert Ms. Christensen's accident claim into an occupational disease claim. 
L There Was No Legal Basis For Smith's Appeal. 
This Court should deny Smith's appeal because there was no legal basis to 
involuntarily convert an adjudicated accident claim to an occupational disease. Utah law 
created workplace injury claims as a remedy for injured employees. Employees - not the 
employer or the Commission - may choose one cause of action, or another, or both as 
alternative claims. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417. When Smith's brief argued that Ms. 
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Christensen's accident "should be reclassified" as an occupational disease, Brief at 25, it 
presumed that Smith's or the Labor Commission had the legal authority to convert her 
cause of action. But there was no legal authority for Smith's premise. The brief cited no 
statute or rule that would permit the Commission to convert or change Petitioner's theory 
of recovery for her work injuries.9 To the contrary, courts do not decide what causes of 
action to bring for parties; instead, they take evidence, and decide if a party did, or did 
not, prove a party's chosen cause of action. This Court should deny Smith's appeal 
because there was no authority for its argument. 
2. The Commission Can Not Even Change An Employee ys Theory Of 
Recovery Within The Same Cause Of Action, Therefore, The 
Commission Can Not Change An Employee's Cause of Action. 
Smith's ignored well-settled law that barred the Commission from changing even 
the employee's theory of recovery under the same cause of action. In the case of Hilton 
Hotel v. Indus. Comm % 897 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995), this Court struck down a 
Commission order where the judge sua sponte changed the employee's theory of 
recovery. In that case, the employee lifted a tub of dishes when she felt low back pain. 
Later, she lifted a tray of meals up onto her left shoulder, and felt pain in her back. She 
filed an industrial accident claim, based only on the single tray-lifting episode. The 
9
 Ms. Christensen is not aware of any area of law where a defendant or court 
can involuntarily convert a plaintiffs proven cause of action into a different cause of 
action, with different requirements, and a different remedy. 
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Commission awarded her compensation based on the "repetitious lifting of losided serving 
trays," (quoting Nyrehn v. Indus. Comm % 800 P.2d at 336). In other words, the 
Commission found that Petitioner had been injured by accident, but by cumulative 
trauma, instead of a single lifting episode as Petitioner had alleged. 
Hilton appealed, and claimed that a cumulative trauma theory of industrial 
accident was never briefed or raised as a theory of recovery, and was thereby prevented 
from presenting evidence to rebut the Commission's conclusions. This Court agreed and 
reversed: "Because cumulative trauma was not an expressed or implied theory presented 
by [the employee], she waived the right to advance that claim. Therefore, the 
Commission's decision regarding this issue was outside the issues presented for 
adjudication and is a nullity." Id. at 356. Under Hilton, the Commission was barred from 
changing the employees' theory of recovery from a single lifting episode to a cumulative 
trauma theory, even though they were both industrial accident theories. 
This Court has repeatedly ruled that judges can not change the theory of recovery, 
even under the same cause of action for industrial accident. Acosta v. Labor Commission, 
2002 UT App 67,44 P.3d 819 (affirming Commission's reversal of award, where 
employee plead single lifting episode, and ALJ awarded based on cumulative trauma 
theory of accident). Put simply, the Commission can not change the employee's theory of 
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recovery, even within the same cause of action for industrial accident.10 But Smith's 
argument went even further: it sought to change the cause of action; not just the theory of 
recovery under the same cause of action. If the Commission had no authority to change a 
theory of recovery under the same cause of action, then the Commission could not 
convert Ms. Christensen's cause of action to a different cause of action for occupational 
disease. Smith's argument to convert industrial accident claims to occupational disease 
claims contradicted well-established legal precedent, and should be rejected. 
This Court should deny Smith's appeal because there was no basis to convert Ms. 
Christensen's industrial accident claim into an occupational disease. Courts can not 
change plaintiffs theory of recovery, let alone a cause of action. Ms. Christensen chose 
her remedy, presented her facts, and was awarded compensation and benefits because she 
proved her cumulative trauma theory of industrial accident. This Court should affirm the 
Commission's award, and deny Smith's appeal. 
10
 For example, a judge in a products liability case can not change the 
plaintiffs theory of recovery from breach of warranty to strict liability, even though they 
are both theories of recovery under a products liability claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the Commission's order awarding Ms. Christensen's 
compensation and benefits for her cervical injury and fusion surgery because it correctly 
found that Ms. Christensen was injured by cumulative trauma accident - a theory of 
accident that has been recognized for over forty years. This appeal failed to challenge the 
dual elements of Ms. Christensen's industrial accident (legal and medical causation), and 
should be denied. This Court should affirm the Commission's order, and hold that Ms. 
Christensen's repetitive work exertions including lifting tools weighing up to 70 pounds, 
during 12 hour shifts over a four month period stated an accident claim because they were 
the legal and medical cause of her injuries. This appeal should also be denied because 
courts can not convert proven causes of action to different causes of action, and there was 
no legal basis for Smith's appeal where Ms. Christensen had proven her accident case. 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the Commission's order, and deny Smith's 
appeal. 
DATED this 19th day of April, 2010. 
KING & BURKE, P.C. 
Richard R. Burke 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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